I am an economist and an assistant professor of finance at
The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen.
My primary fields of interests: corporate finance, banking, and macro-finance.
Asset-side Bank Runs and Liquidity Rationing: A Vicious Cycle
Selected presentations: AFA(2018)
This article studies the role of bank liquidity rationing in managing panics in a
dynamic model of credit line run. In downturns banks tighten liquidity by cutting
credit lines. Anticipating this, borrowers run to draw down credit lines in the first
place, which imposes further pressure on banks. Thus liquidity rationing and credit
line runs form a feedback loop that amplifies bank distress. This feedback effects contribute to about two-
thirds of the total credit contraction in downturns.
Quantifying Reduced-Form Evidence on Collateral Constraints
with Sylvain Catherine, Thomas Chaney, David Sraer, and David Thesmar
second round R&R at the Journal of Finance
While a mature literature shows that credit constraints causally affect firm-level investment, this literature provides little guidance to quantify the economic effects implied by these findings. Our paper attempts to fill this gap in two ways. First, we use a structural model of firm dynamics with collateral constraints, and estimate the model to match the firm-level sensitivity of investment to collateral values. We estimate that firms can only pledge about 19% of their collateral value. Second, we embed this model in a general equilibrium framework and estimate that, relative to first-best, collateral constraints are responsible for 11% output losses.
Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Endogenous Skill Premia
with Jason Ravit and Michael Sockin
Selected presentations: Econometric Society North America Meeting(2017)
We embed imperfect substitutability across skill levels into a dynamic Mirrlees
model and uncover a novel intertemporal wage compression channel in optimal labor
taxation that can rationalize redistributive programs such as the Earned Income Tax
The Risk of Implicit Guarantees: Evidence from Shadow Banks in China
with Xiang Shao and Ji Huang
Selected presentations: ABFER, CEPR and CUHK First Annual Symposium On Financial Economics
We use a micro-level data set on
China's shadow bank products to quantify the risk of implicit guarantees. We find a robust empirical
fact that banks extend more implicit guarantees to their shadow bank debt when their own default risks increase.
Security-bid Auctions with Information Acquisition (new draft coming soon)
with Yunan Li
We study security-bid auctions in which bidders compete for an asset by bidding with securities whose payments
are contingent on the asset's realized value and can covertly acquire information at some cost before participating
in an auction. We first consider auctions with ordered securities in which the seller restricts the security design
to an ordered set and uses a first- or second-price auction. We show that steeper securities give agents lower marginal
return to information and may yield lower revenues. We then study linear mechanisms in which payments linearly depend on
the asset's realized value. We show that the revenue-maximizing linear mechanism assigns the asset efficiently,
and the winner pays in cash if their expected values are high and pays in stock if their expected values are low.
This result implies that the use of cash payment is positively correlated to synergies in merges and acquisitions.
We empirically test this implication and find consistent results.
Haircuts and Credit Risk over the Cycle
Selected presentations: Econometric Society World Congress(2015)
This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous
beliefs and collateral constraints. The endogenously determined haircuts are countercyclical and
thus lead to a downward margin spiral that exacerbates financial instability.
School of Management and Economics, 2001 Longxiang Road
Longgang District, Shenzhen, 518172, China